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DISCUSSING PRIVACY IN SEC SUBPOENA PRACTICE AFTER 
CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES
WILLIAM A. BALLENTINE*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has initi-
ated a formal investigation into a hedge fund after suspecting several key 
officers of insider trading and conducting a thorough examination. One of 
the fund executives receives a subpoena ordering all the documents in her 
office “related to the investigation” be turned over to the SEC, including 
her emails, chat room conversations, travel records, expense reports, and 
any other business-related communications. Although firm policy requires 
written work-related communications to be done only through company 
email or Bloomberg chat, the executive is concerned that her personal 
smart phone may be implicated in the subpoena as well. Many of her fel-
low colleagues are also her friends, so naturally she uses her smart phone 
for both personal and work-related reasons. 
This Note discusses what effects, if any, the decision handed down in 
Carpenter v. United States may have on national subpoena practice, focus-
ing solely on the Securities and Exchange Commission as the agency gen-
erally enjoys broad authority to issue subpoenas. Part I explains the 
background leading up to Carpenter and its highly anticipated holdings 
about statutorily mandated production being unable to endure Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny. An analysis of three different ways to acquire infor-
mation in a government investigation—through a warrant, grand jury sub-
poena, or the Stored Communications Act in certain circumstances—takes 
place in Part II. Part III then discusses the general standard for administra-
tive subpoenas as a fourth method of obtaining information. As a method 
requiring less of a showing than the Stored Communications Act, this Note 
will argue that issuing an administrative subpoena for personal documents 
would not likely withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge as seen in Car-
penter. Part IV discusses troubling scenarios where the SEC could demand 
* Chicago-Kent College of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2020. I would like to thank Professor 
Doug Godfrey for his inspiration and guidance throughout writing this Note.  
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private documents, along with what a Fourth Amendment challenge to an 
SEC subpoena may sound like after Carpenter. Finally, Part V makes con-
cluding comments about subpoena practice and privacy in a modern world. 
I. CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES
Carpenter is a highly anticipated Supreme Court case concerning the 
privacy of an individual’s historical cell phone location records stored with 
a wireless carrier. The decision was handed down in June 2018. In deliver-
ing the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized how perva-
sive cell phone usage has become in modern American society and, thus, 
expressed concern over colliding technological advancements and civil 
liberties. Certainly, Americans have become accustomed to cell phones 
being an integral part of everyday life. Approximately 94% of American 
adults in modern society use cell phones for various functions and pleas-
ures, especially considering the seemingly endless capabilities of the popu-
lar smartphone.1 Cell phones enable people to be readily available and 
follow people everywhere they go—even to the most intimate spaces. 
While there is no doubt cell phones provide an ease to certain aspects of 
life, the technology also inherently requires anyone with a cell phone to 
sacrifice some of their privacy. 
To perform properly, cell phones must connect to radio antennas 
called “cell-sites” which are found in a variety of places, such as towers or 
light posts.2 Modern devices are constantly scanning the surrounding area 
for a signal—sometimes multiple times a minute—even when the cell 
phone’s owner is not actively using the phone’s features.3 In effect, cell 
phones are continuously relaying their approximate location to cell towers 
and, thus, the user’s cell service provider. The accuracy of the cell phone’s 
location directly depends on the concentration of the cell-sites in a given 
area, so populated urban areas are seeing increasingly compact coverage as 
more cell-sites are installed there.4
This geographic data is properly referred to as an individual’s cell-site 
location information (CSLI), which are time-stamped records created every 
time a cell phone connects to a cell-site.5 Cell phone service providers reg-
 1.  KYLE TAYLOR & LAURA SILVER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SMARTPHONE OWNERSHIP IS
GROWING RAPIDLY AROUND THE WORLD, BUT NOT ALWAYS EQUALLY (2019), 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2019/02/05/smartphone-ownership-is-growing-rapidly-around-the-world-
but-not-always-equally/ [https://perma.cc/V43S-V8H5]. 
 2.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
 3.  Id.
 4.  Id. at 2211–12. 
 5.  Id. at 2211. 
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ularly collect this data for performance and billing purposes.6 Law en-
forcement may access this data as it happens in real time by asking the 
court for a prospective order, or it may access the data already retained by 
the service provider to get a better sense of a suspect’s past whereabouts.7
In both instances, law enforcement must apply for a court order to access 
the data.8
Law enforcement can request both historical and prospective CSLI 
through administrative processes in order to put together a sequence of past 
events or to ascertain the location of an individual during a past crime.9 In 
Carpenter, the Government sought to do just that by relying on a statutory 
regime, namely the Stored Communications Act (SCA), to gain access to a 
criminal suspect’s historical location information through the suspect’s cell 
service provider.10
A. Background 
The United States Government suspected that Timothy Carpenter, the 
petitioner in this case, played a role in a series of robberies that took place 
around the Detroit area in 2011.11 Initially, police officers arrested four 
men other than Carpenter for the robberies, and one confessed to robbing 
nine stores in Michigan and Ohio.12 The same suspect revealed there were 
fifteen accomplices in the heists and gave up some of their cell phone num-
bers to the FBI.13 Timothy Carpenter’s phone number was among the 
phone numbers on the list that the FBI received. 
Relying on the SCA, the prosecutors applied for court orders and ob-
tained Carpenter’s historical cell site information from the four-month time 
frame when the robberies occurred.14 Federal magistrate judges issued two 
orders to Carpenter’s cellular service providers, MetroPCS and Sprint: the 
first order sought 152 days of cell-site records from MetroPCS, and the 
 6.  Kevin McLaughlin, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking: Where Are 
We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 431 (2007). 
 7.  Id.
 8.  Patrick T. Chamberlain, Court Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location Infor-
mation: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745, 1747–48 
(2009). 
 9.  NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, CELL PHONE LOCATION 
TRACKING, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016-06-07_Cell-Tracking-
Primer_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ8K-2KF3] [hereinafter NACDL].  
 10.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. 
 11.  Id. at 2212. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id.
 14.  Id.
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second order sought seven days of cell-site records from Sprint.15 The or-
ders produced 127 days of records and two days of records from MetroPCS 
and Sprint, respectively.16
Based on the cell-site data provided by wireless carriers, Carpenter 
was charged with multiple counts of both robbery and “carrying a firearm 
during a federal crime of violence.”17 Carpenter’s chief argument relied on 
the Fourth Amendment. Carpenter argued his Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated when the Government seized CSLI from his wireless carriers 
absent the traditional probable cause requirement, and he moved to sup-
press the records before trial.18 The district court denied the motion, and at 
trial an FBI agent’s expert testimony about CSLI placed Carpenter’s phone 
near four of the robberies at the time the robberies occurred.19 Consequent-
ly, Carpenter was convicted on all counts except for one of the firearm 
counts, and he was sentenced to over 100 years in prison.20
At the appellate level, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s de-
cision, holding Carpenter had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
CSLI because he voluntarily shared the data with each of his cellular ser-
vice providers.21 Thus, Carpenter could not claim that his Fourth Amend-
ment rights protected the disclosure of those resulting business records.22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
B. Reasoning 
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court delivered two significant holdings: 
(1) accessing at least seven days of CSLI constitutes a search under the 
purview of the Fourth Amendment given the legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in physical movements captured by CSLI; and (2) to access those 
CSLI records, a warrant supported by probable cause is required. 
The first of the two primary holdings is important for understanding 
the type of information that is under the Fourth Amendment’s purview and 
to what extent the Court is willing to extend Fourth Amendment doctrine in 
an increasingly technological world. Arguably, the second holding con-
cerning warrants and subpoenas is of greater significance as it potentially 
 15.  Id.
 16.  Id.
 17.  Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). 
 18.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
 19.  Id. at 2212–13. 
 20.  Id. at 2213. 
 21.  Id.
 22.  Id.
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calls a subpoena’s utility into question. Section III will address the Fourth 
Amendment’s relation to warrants and subpoenas—and the difference be-
tween the two. 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion, and there was a clear majori-
ty with the decision being 5-4. The four liberal-leaning Justices—Justice 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor—joined the Chief Justice. In 
turn, Justice Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch each wrote separate 
dissenting opinions. In particular, Justice Alito’s dissent emphasized the 
negative implications for subpoena practice. 
The Government’s access of Carpenter’s cell-site records was a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts was tasked with ex-
plaining how the Fourth Amendment works in light of a “new phenome-
non”; that is, the new capability to obtain all of an individual’s past 
movements by accessing his or her cell phone records.23 The first step, as is 
true for most Fourth Amendment questions, was to decide whether obtain-
ing Carpenter’s cell-site data from his wireless carriers would be consid-
ered a search under Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
In pertinent part, the Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”24 Its main purpose is “to safeguard 
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by gov-
ernmental officials.”25 Repudiating the old Fourth Amendment doctrine 
traditionally linked with common-law trespass, the Court reestablished it is 
“people, not places,” that the Fourth Amendment protects.26 For an official 
action to be considered a Fourth Amendment search, it must have violated 
an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy “that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable.”27 In turn, access to that private information 
requires a warrant supported by probable cause.28
The Court is intent on protecting individual privacy against arbitrary 
and pervasive police power by acknowledging that Fourth Amendment 
boundaries will be stretched as technology becomes more advanced.29 For 
example, the Court has applied the Fourth Amendment flexibly in some 
 23.  Id. at 2216. 
 24.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 25.  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985). 
 26.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 27.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 28.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213.  
 29.  Id. at 2214; McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 429–30.  
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cases to make sure that an individual’s privacy was not left to “the mercy 
of advancing technology.”30
Carpenter marks the first instance where the Court considered the 
Government’s warrantless access to an individual’s cell-site location data 
through his wireless carrier. The reasoning employed in existing precedents 
did not easily agree with the facts—specifically, the cell-site data—in this 
case.31 Largely, the Court relied on United States v. Jones, where the Gov-
ernment tracked an individual’s movements for 28 days after placing a GPS 
tracking device on his vehicle.32 While Jones was decided based on tres-
pass principles, the concurring opinions indicated that long-term GPS 
tracking in investigations often infringe on expectations of privacy and may 
require a warrant.33
Similar to the GPS tracking in Jones, CSLI is “detailed, encyclopedic, 
and effortlessly compiled.”34 According to the Government, however, the 
third-party doctrine should have controlled the outcome of Carpenter.35
Based on United States v. Miller36 and Smith v. Maryland,37 the Govern-
ment asserted it was free to obtain Carpenter’s cell-site records without 
infringing his Fourth Amendment rights because he voluntarily turned that 
data over to a third party.38 Still, because the data conveyed to third parties 
in this case gave a “detailed and comprehensive record of [Carpenter’s] 
movements,” the fact that the data rested with a third party was not enough 
to overcome Carpenter’s Fourth Amendment concerns.39
In the majority’s view, the privacy concerns surrounding CSLI are 
more troubling than those encountered when the Government monitors a 
vehicle with a tracking device.40 An individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy extends to “the whole of [his] physical movements” and, consider-
 30.  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001) (holding that federal agents conducted 
a Fourth Amendment search when they used a thermal imaging device scan an individual’s home). 
 31.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214. 
 32.  565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012). 
 33.  Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment); Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 34.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216. 
 35.  Id. at 2219. 
 36.  425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (holding that a bank patron had no expectation of privacy in the 
financial records held by his bank). 
 37.  442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that an individual had no expectation of privacy in records 
of dialed telephone numbers kept with a telephone company). 
 38.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
 39.  Id. at 2216–17, 2220. For a discussion about the status of the third-party doctrine, see Orin S. 
Kerr, First Thoughts on Carpenter v. United States, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jun. 22, 2018, 12:20 PM), 
https://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/22/first-thoughts-on-carpenter-v-united-sta 
[https://perma.cc/M5HG-K59T]. 
 40.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
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ing individuals are rarely without their cell phones, government access to 
cell phone location records allows almost perfect surveillance of a cell 
phone user’s movements.41 Accordingly, the Government accessing Car-
penter’s cell-site records—even while they were stored with a third party—
constituted a Fourth Amendment search.42
The Government must have obtained a warrant supported by probable 
cause before accessing Carpenter’s cell-site records.
After finding the Government’s access to Carpenter’s cell-site records 
constituted a Fourth Amendment search, the Court questioned what stand-
ard the government must satisfy in order to lawfully acquire those rec-
ords.43 When law enforcement officials conduct a search to discover 
evidence of a crime without a warrant, the search is typically deemed un-
reasonable unless it qualifies as an exception to the warrant requirement.44
Here, the Government compelled Carpenter’s wireless carriers to dis-
close his cell-site records by obtaining a court order under Section 2703(d) 
of the Stored Communications Act.45 Court orders are only issued under 
Section 2703(d) if the Government or governmental entity shows “reasona-
ble grounds” to believe that the records sought are “relevant and material to 
an ongoing criminal investigation.”46 Compared to the standard required 
for a warrant—probable cause—the Section 2703(d) standard is clearly less 
demanding.47 Accordingly, the Government’s use of court-approved com-
pulsory process under the SCA was an invalid method for accessing an 
individual’s CSLI—a warrant was still required.48
Chief Justice Roberts then turned to the contrary arguments in Justice 
Alito’s dissenting opinion. For Justice Alito, the compulsory production of 
documents is merely a “constructive search” that is far less intrusive on an 
individual’s privacy than an “actual search,” and the warrant requirement 
should not apply in such instances.49 In theory, a subpoenaed individual 
conducts the search for the relevant documents himself and avoids any 
inadvertent invasions of privacy that might accompany an actual search 
conducted by a governmental official.50 Thus, a court order to produce 
 41.  Id. at 2219. The majority notes that the technology considered in this case is “rapidly ap-
proaching GPS-level precision.” Id.
 42.  Id. at 2220. 
 43.  Id. at 2221. 
 44.  Id.
 45.  Id.
 46.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. 
 47.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. 
 48.  Id.
 49.  Id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 50.  Id. at 2252 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
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documents should not be treated like an actual search that requires probable 
cause.51
But the majority again stressed that CSLI is wrought with Fourth 
Amendment privacy concerns that far outweigh those that accompany 
“corporate tax or payroll ledgers” mentioned in the examples Justice Alito 
cites.52 If Fourth Amendment protection did not apply to the subpoena pro-
cess as Justice Alito suggests, the majority asserts the warrant requirement 
would no longer be able to protect any type of record, and the government 
could subpoena any document based only on “official curiosity.”53 The 
majority was not willing to adopt that categorical limitation on the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Regardless of the majority’s reassurances, Justice Alito fears that im-
posing the requirements governing actual searches and seizures on a court 
order to produce documents is “revolutionary” and will hinder investiga-
tions of significant offenses.54
II. THE SCA AND TWO COMPETING STANDARDS TO PRODUCE
DOCUMENTS
In criminal procedure, there are traditionally two kinds of legal pro-
cess available when the Government wants to gain access to some sort of 
incriminating evidence—namely, the search warrant and subpoena pro-
cess.55 The two paths are distinguishable in that their execution is regulated 
by two different legal regimes.56 For a search warrant, the Fourth Amend-
ment limits and imposes a higher standard on investigators.57 Issuing a 
grand jury subpoena, on the other hand, may be done without abiding by 
the stringent requirements for a search warrant. The Fourth Amendment 
still applies in the subpoena context, but its presence is not very significant 
for reasons discussed below. 
If search warrants and grand jury subpoenas are at opposite ends of 
the spectrum in terms of the legal standard involved to obtain evidence, 
then the process laid out in Section 2703(d) of the Stored Communications 
Act is somewhere in between. The “2703(d)” order could be described as 
 51.  Id. at 2221. 
 52.  Id. at 2222. 
 53.  Id. (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)). 
 54.  Id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 55.  Orin S. Kerr, Does Carpenter Revolutionize the Law of Subpoenas?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Jun. 26, 2018, 5:36 PM), http://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/26/does-carpenter-revolutionize-the-law-of 
[https://perma.cc/QC4D-DBCW]. 
 56.  Id.
 57.  Id.
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“a mix between a subpoena and a search warrant.”58 Nonetheless, the Court 
in Carpenter held the Congress-prescribed standard for compelling produc-
tion of records featured in the SCA could not pass muster Fourth Amend-
ment scrutiny—at least in the CSLI context—and a warrant is still required 
to access those records.59
The Carpenter holding raises several concerns about subpoena prac-
tice: (1) Whether and how the holding affects grand jury or administrative 
subpoenas, where there is seemingly a lower standard to meet; and (2) 
Whether warrants now subsume the role of subpoenas from grand juries 
and administrative agencies, alike. To begin answering some of these ques-
tions, understanding the legal processes available for obtaining documents 
and their relative standards is imperative. 
A. The Warrant Requirement 
In criminal investigations, the most familiar legal mechanism used to 
obtain evidence is the search warrant.60 A valid search warrant allows in-
vestigators to physically intrude into a private area in order to obtain in-
formation; however, the Fourth Amendment offers individual protections—
applied to both criminal and civil investigations—that generally place lim-
its on investigators.61 Under the Fourth Amendment, people are afforded 
the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,” and to 
be protected “against unreasonable searches and seizures.”62 The Amend-
ment also requires probable cause to accompany each warrant a magistrate 
or judge issues.63
At the forefront, the Fourth Amendment was adopted “to safeguard 
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by gov-
ernment officials.”64 Without the clear authority of law, government offi-
cials have no right to interfere with an individual’s personal security, which 
is “sacred.”65 And “the protection against warrantless searches and sei-
zures” works to ensure that a neutral magistrate’s judgment acts as a buffer 
 58.  Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1219 (2004). 
 59.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018). 
 60.  Kerr, supra note 55. 
 61.  Id.
 62.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  T.L.O., supra note 25, at 335. 
 65.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). 
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between individuals and the unbridled power of a government “official 
caught up in the heat of an investigation.”66
Accordingly, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.67 Even 
though the Fourth Amendment does not necessarily require a warrant or 
probable cause to support a search, the Supreme Court has held a warrant is 
presumably required for searches and seizures unless “a specific exception 
to the warrant requirement” applies.68
While most warrantless searches are done upon consent, other excep-
tions to the warrant requirement exist only in rare circumstances. The con-
stitutionality of a warrantless Fourth Amendment search turns on a 
question of reasonableness, determined by “balancing its intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legiti-
mate governmental interests.”69 Where special law enforcement needs, low 
expectations of privacy, and minimal intrusions exist, a warrantless search 
is more likely to be considered reasonable, and, thus, constitutional.70
1. Probable Cause 
Aside from special circumstances, investigators generally need a war-
rant supported by probable cause to conduct an official search protected by 
the Fourth Amendment. After all, the warrant requirement is partially based 
on the idea that any search or seizure is inherently wrong and should not be 
executed without first determining whether the action is truly necessary.71
And if a search must take place, the scope of the search should be limited.72
A search warrant requires a different factual showing than an arrest 
warrant, given that the two protect different interests listed in the Fourth 
Amendment.73 While an arrest warrant addresses an individual’s right 
against unreasonable seizures, search warrants protect an individual’s “rea-
 66.  79 C.J.S. Searches § 16 (2018).  
 67.  See, e.g., City of Los Angeles, Calif. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (concluding a 
municipal code requiring hotel operators to provide police with information about guests was unconsti-
tutional); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
See 79 C.J.S. Searches § 15 (2018). 
 68.  See Investigations and Police Practices, 47 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 4 n.4 (2018) 
[hereinafter Investigations]; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) (A warrantless search is 
unreasonable unless “it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement”).  
 69.  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) (quoting Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)) (concluding that random urinalysis tests of student 
athletes were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment considering the state’s legitimate interests and 
the intrusiveness of the tests).  
 70.  79 C.J.S. Searches § 15 (2018). 
 71.  See Searches, supra note 66. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Investigations, supra note 68, at 25. 
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sonable expectation of privacy”74 and possessions against government in-
trusion. These protections hold especially true for individuals in their own 
home; although, the Supreme Court has articulated that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”75
A magistrate may only issue a search warrant after investigators show 
“probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is located 
in a particular place.”76 “[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense 
standard” that depends on the totality of the circumstances in each case.77
Still, the factual showing required for probable cause is significant—a rea-
sonable and unbiased mind must be persuaded to believe a crime has actu-
ally occurred as opposed to causing mere suspicion or speculation of a 
crime.78
Probable cause does not require certainty on the belief that the sought 
evidence will establish a prima facie element of a crime.79 Instead, what is 
relevant is the probability that a crime has occurred and the probability that 
criminal evidence exists and will be found.80 In assessing these probabili-
ties, magistrates consult all the facts and circumstances within the warrant 
application using a “practical, common-sense” approach.81
2. The Particularity Requirement 
To avoid “wide-ranging exploratory searches,” a search warrant must 
describe with particularity the places that will be searched and the people 
or objects that will be seized under the Fourth Amendment.82 The require-
ment ensures searches are narrowly tailored to the justification making 
them necessary at the outset and prevents, among other things, warrants 
from being issued without an adequate factual basis or probable cause.83
Like probable cause, the totality of circumstances in each case deter-
mines whether a search warrant describes a place with sufficient particular-
ity—the description ought to be as precise as possible given the 
circumstances.84 The particularity question also considers whether the war-
 74.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 75.  Id. at 351. 
 76.  Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981). 
 77.  79 C.J.S. Searches § 67 (2018). 
 78.  Id.
 79.  Id.
 80.  Id.
 81.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Investigations, supra note 68, at 28. 
 82.  Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987); U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 83.  79 C.J.S. Searches § 235 (2018). 
 84.  79 C.J.S. Searches § 236 (2018). 
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rant provides adequate protection for an individual’s privacy and personal 
rights, and whether the warrant puts the party searched on proper notice.85
The description within the warrant should be precise enough so as to 
leave the executing officer without the opportunity to exercise any of his or 
her own discretion during the search.86 But when a warrant is overbroad or 
otherwise mistaken, an executing officer may use his or her personal 
knowledge to narrow down the intended search area.87
3. The Grand Jury Subpoena 
Indeed, warrants are often used during criminal investigations. But the 
warrant is not the only legal process available to obtain information—the 
subpoena is the primary mechanism the Government uses routinely to col-
lect records and other documents.88 Grand juries issue thousands of these 
each year.89
As distinguished from a search warrant, which allows government of-
ficials to physically intrude on private property in search of incriminating 
evidence, a subpoena duces tecum directs a recipient to gather evidence his 
or herself and bring the evidence to a grand jury at a later date.90 A third-
party witness may also be summoned to testify in front of a grand jury with 
a subpoena ad testificandum.91
By using a subpoena, the Government may obtain access to various 
kinds of “papers” with a far lesser showing than probable cause. In that 
main respect, the law regarding grand jury subpoenas is very different from 
the law governing warrants—which also explains why subpoenas are pref-
erable to search warrants when it comes to requesting routine documents. 
A subpoena, unlike a search warrant issued ex parte, may be chal-
lenged by the recipient before compliance.92 Under the Fourth Amendment, 
the only refuge available to a recipient is arguing that the subpoena is over-
broad, irrelevant, or too burdensome to comply with.93 Courts show ex-
treme deference to the grand jury and, consequently, these objections rarely 
 85.  Id.
 86.  Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). 
 87.  Investigations, supra note 68, at 34. 
 88.  Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 805 (2005). 
 89.  Id.
 90.  Kerr, supra note 55. 
 91.  98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 21 (2018). 
 92.  Slobogin, supra note 88, at 806, 810. 
 93.  Id. at 806; United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2012); In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 920 F.2d 235, 243–244 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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prevail.94 For example, there would have to be “no reasonable possibility” 
that the information the Government is seeking relates to the subject matter 
of the grand jury’s investigation in order for a subpoena to be struck down 
as irrelevant.95
Still, a recipient may challenge a subpoena using another means, 
namely, his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In a 
unique circumstance when responding to a subpoena duces tecum, an indi-
vidual may be able to assert Fifth Amendment privilege if the act of pro-
ducing the documents requested conveys additional information that may 
be incriminating.96 Usually, the Fifth Amendment privilege is unavaila-
ble.97
Consequently, grand jury subpoenas duces tecum are easily en-
forced.98 They are controlled and issued in the name of the grand jury; but, 
in reality, the prosecutors who manage the grand jury are behind each sub-
poena—prosecutors ask for, draft, serve, and defend each subpoena.99
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has traditionally held grand jury subpoe-
nas to a low standard, indicating that a subpoena seeking to satisfy “nothing 
more than official curiosity” is constitutional.100 The Government may use 
a subpoena to acquire documents so long as “the documents sought are 
relevant to the [investigation]” and the document request is “adequate, but 
not excessive,” for those same purposes.101
Before Carpenter, subpoenas aimed at third-party recordholders 
seemed to be unrestricted. The phenomenon was especially concerning 
given that modern society often requires personal information be kept with 
some third party—and third parties are unable to plausibly assert the Fifth 
Amendment privilege over someone else’s information.102 In the same 
context, the third-party doctrine curtailed any Fourth Amendment claims 
 94.  Slobogin, supra note 88, at 806. 
 95.  United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (rejecting a company’s challenge 
to grand jury subpoenas for corporate records because it did not establish there was no reasonable 
possibility the information produced would be relevant to the grand jury’s investigation). 
 96.  Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (noting that a party conceding that it pos-
sesses the requested papers is a foregone conclusion and does not add any useful incriminating infor-
mation to the investigation). 
 97.  Slobogin, supra note 88, at 806. 
 98.  Id.
 99.  Kerr, supra note 55. 
 100.  United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (concluding agencies have a right 
to request information from corporations even if for no other reason than “official curiosity”).
 101.  Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946) (upholding the production of a 
newspaper publishing corporation’s books and records as request was made pursuant to statute and was 
reasonably relevant). 
 102.  Slobogin, supra note 88, at 808. 
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over information voluntarily shared with a third party.103 Now, Carpenter
at least signifies that conveying information to a third party is but a factor 
in determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy in such information—the conveyance is not dispositive. 
B. The Stored Communications Act 
Enacted as Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986, the SCA regulates both the voluntary and compelled disclosure of 
stored internet communications records retained by internet service provid-
ers.104 Largely, Congress enacted the SCA to bridge the gap between legit-
imate Fourth Amendment concerns and the internet’s general structure.105
The Fourth Amendment, while generally ensuring strong protections for 
individuals in their homes, might not offer those same protections to indi-
viduals operating online.106 For example, the Government must obtain a 
search warrant supported by probable cause to search someone’s home for 
a letter in a desk drawer but only needs a subpoena to access that same 
letter remotely stored in a Google web account under the third-party doc-
trine.107 The letter clearly has much less protection in the latter scenario. 
Consequently, the SCA works to provide network account holders with 
various statutory rights making access to their stored account information 
more secure.108
Under the SCA, the government typically seeks two types of infor-
mation: (1) contents of wire or electronic communications in electronic 
storage and remote computing services109; and (2) “records concerning 
electronic communication service[s] or remote computing service[s],” 
which notably do not contain the contents of communications.110 Cell-site 
location information falls under the latter category; the information does 
not qualify as the “contents of communications.”111 Thus, Section 2703(c), 
which addresses the disclosure of “a record or other information pertaining 
 103.  See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). Craig Ettinger, Does the History 
Behind the Adoption of the Fourth Amendment Demand Abolishing the Third-Party Doctrine?, 29 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1, 19–23 (2018), for a general discussion about the third-party doctrine and its 
creation.  
 104.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2018). 
 105.  Kerr, supra note 58, at 1209 (explaining the structure of the Stored Communications Act and 
suggesting Congress amend the statute to better protect individuals’ stored internet communications). 
 106.  Id. at 1209–10. 
 107.  Id. at 1209, 1212. 
 108.  Id. at 1212. 
 109.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b) (2018). 
 110.  § 2703(c). 
 111.  Chamberlain, supra note 8, at 1756. 
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to a subscriber to or customer of [a provider of electronic communication 
or remote computing] service,” applies when the government seeks access 
to CSLI.112
Before Carpenter, the SCA ostensibly provided the government with 
three avenues it could take to compel the disclosure of CSLI records.113
First, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a governmental 
entity can obtain a warrant.114 Instead of using the process required for a 
warrant, investigators could either obtain “the consent of the subscriber or 
customer to such disclosure”115 or compel disclosure with a court order 
under Section 2703(d).116 In pertinent part, Section 2703(d) states: 
A court order for disclosure . . . shall issue only if the governmental enti-
ty offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communica-
tion, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material 
to an ongoing criminal investigation.117
Notably, the Government in Carpenter abided by the requirements 
laid out in Section 2703(d) of the SCA in order to access Carpenter’s cell-
site location information through a court order.118 A magistrate found the 
Government had offered “specific and articulable facts showing that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation” and 
issued two court orders.119 Investigators serve court orders under Section 
2703(d) just like they would an ordinary subpoena—by bringing the order 
to the service provider who then provides investigators with the infor-
mation sought.120
Holding that access to Carpenter’s CSLI nonetheless required a war-
rant seemingly does not undermine two of the relevant processes (obtaining 
a warrant or prior consent) available to the government listed in Section 
2703(c); however, when seeking sensitive information akin to CSLI and the 
probable cause requirements are satisfied, the Government would presuma-
bly elect to issue a warrant, displacing the subpoena process.121
 112.  See § 2703(c); Chamberlain, supra note 8, at 1756. 
 113.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018); Kerr, supra note 58, at 1218–19. 
 114.  See § 2703(c).  
 115.  Id.
 116.  Id.
 117.  § 2703(d). 
 118.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018). 
 119.  See § 2703(d); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
 120.  See Kerr, supra note 58, at 1219. 
 121.  Marty Lederman, Carpenter’s Curiosities (and its Potential to Unsettle Longstanding Fourth 
Amendment Doctrines), BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2018), 
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Indeed, the Court’s holding is just as significant of a triumph for pri-
vacy rights as it is a departure from traditional subpoena practice and the 
third-party doctrine. 
III. A FOURTH STANDARD: ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS OR 
SUMMONS
Created through statute, many federal administrative agencies are 
charged with implementing regulatory or fiscal policies.122 In order to ful-
fill those duties, agencies need sufficient investigatory power to access 
information, which is largely derived from an agency’s power to subpoena 
records and testimony.123 Congress authorizes this power through a statute, 
namely, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) that grants agencies 
subpoena power if another statute authorizes issuance.124 Thus, each agen-
cy has its own enabling statute granting it the power to issue administrative 
subpoenas.125
Today, administrative agencies have broad power to issue subpoenas 
without prior approval from a grand jury or court.126 Individuals and enti-
ties subject to agency regulation often have an incentive to cooperate with 
the agency’s subpoena or voluntarily produce documents or testimony.127
But administrative subpoenas are not self-enforcing, and agencies need to 
bring the subpoena to a federal judge in order to compel document or tes-
timony production from those who choose not to comply.128 Further failure 
to comply with a court order may result in the target being held in con-
tempt.129
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/06/carpenter-s-curiosities-and-its.html [https://perma.cc/EE8N-SLEZ] 
(arguing that the Carpenter holding has “groundbreaking” implications for national subpoena practice).  
 122.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND ENTITIES (2002) 
[hereinafter DOJ Report], https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm#b19 
[https://perma.cc/75YL-23DN].
 123.  See Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury: Converging Streams of 
Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573, 579, 584 (1994). 
 124.  See 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1966); COMPULSORY PROCESS, 1 Admin. L. & Prac. § 3:12 (Charles 
H. Koch, Jr. & Richard Murphy eds., 3d ed. 2019).  
 125.  See DOJ REPORT, supra note 122. 
 126.  Id.
 127.  See Abraham Tabaie, Protecting Privacy Expectations and Personal Documents in Sec 
Investigations, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 797 (2008) (arguing that an entity being viewed as “coopera-
tive” with the SEC may be important in resolving the Commission’s inquiry). 
 128.  See, e.g., Sec. Exch. Cmm’n v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 741 (1984) (SEC sub-
poena is not self-enforcing); Wearly v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 616 F.2d 662, 665 (3d Cir.1980). 
 129.  See 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1966); SUBPOENAS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2:4 (Lee Modjeska ed., 2019).  
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Courts have not always respected administrative subpoena power.130
But with the introduction of New Deal initiative and in the aftermath of 
economic crisis, the administrative state grew, and courts began affording 
administrative subpoena enforcement more deference.131 While not without 
its limits, the highly deferential standard has now governed administrative 
subpoena enforcement for over seventy years.132
Indeed, the expansion of administrative investigatory power is derived 
from the principle that excess judicial interference would hinder agencies’ 
ability to execute their statutory responsibilities.133 As such, administrative 
subpoenas are subject to a “reasonableness” standard, which requires a far 
lesser showing than what is required under the “probable cause” standard 
associated with issuing a valid search warrant.134 Courts today frequently 
cite United States v. Powell, where the Supreme Court concluded the Inter-
nal Revenue Service did not need to meet the probable cause standard to 
enforce its administrative summons requesting corporate tax records.135
Instead, the Court articulated a four-factor evaluation for deciding whether 
a summons could be enforced, requiring that (1) the investigation is con-
ducted for a legitimate reason; (2) the inquiry is relevant to the investiga-
tion’s purpose; (3) the agency does not already have the information 
sought; and (4) the agency has followed the proper administrative steps in 
issuing the subpoena.136 While decided in the context of an IRS enforce-
ment action, Powell is generally applicable to all administrative agen-
cies.137
Prior to Powell, administrative subpoenas seeking evidence “not plain-
ly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the [requesting of-
ficer] in the discharge” of his or her statutory responsibilities were 
 130.  See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305–06 (1924) (prohibiting the 
Federal Trade Commission from acquiring a corporation’s letters and wires through a subpoena). 
 131.  See Tabaie, supra note 127, at 789. 
 132.  See Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943) (enforcing an administrative 
subpoena requesting a corporation’s payroll records because the records sought were not “plainly 
incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose”). 
 133.  See Hughes, supra note 123, at 584 (1994) (asserting the arrangement between the govern-
ment and those engaged in licensed commercial activities would be “unworkable” without compulsory 
process). 
 134.  See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (government requests 
for corporate books and records are enforceable without a warrant as long as “the inquiry is within the 
authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably 
relevant”).  
 135.  See 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964). 
 136.  Id. at 57–58. 
 137.  See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1984) (applying 
Powell standards in litigation about enforcing an SEC subpoena). 
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enforceable.138 The Court reinforced this idea in United States v. Morton 
Salt Co., indicating that an administrative subpoena is appropriate even if 
the demand amounts to a mere “fishing expedition” designed only to con-
firm compliance with regulatory requirements.139 So long as the agency has 
the authority to inquire, the demand for information is not too indefinite, 
and the sought after information is “reasonably relevant,” enforcing an 
administrative subpoena is appropriate.140 Courts even defer to the agen-
cy’s determination in what information is “reasonably relevant” to an in-
vestigation barring a scenario where the court deems the agency is 
“obviously wrong.”141 Some of this deference results from agencies having 
developed considerable expertise in technical areas such as taxation, securi-
ties, health and safety, or airplane design and safety. Consequently, admin-
istrative agencies enjoy significant leniency while seeking information and 
do not necessarily need to connect the information sought to any actual 
theory of violation.142
Administrative subpoena enforcement and its doctrine has mirrored 
that of grand jury subpoenas over the years, and some scholars argue the 
two forms of compulsory process are completely assimilated.143 Notably, 
enforcing either type of subpoena would be subject to similar standards and 
scrutiny.144 But the justifications behind the grand jury as an investigative 
body arguably contain a crucial component absent from administrative 
investigations—that a grand jury functions to investigate and prosecute 
crime while protecting citizens from “unfounded criminal charges.” In 
theory, grand juries are independent, democratic institutions composed of 
cooperating citizens and peers, which affords them special legitimacy in 
American jurisprudence.145 Neither of these justifications are applicable to 
administrative agencies, even though agencies take advantage of the same 
broad authority to gather information.146 However, agencies are part of the 
 138.  Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943). 
 139.  See 338 U.S. at 642–43 (attributing the power to “investigate merely on suspicion that the law 
is being violated” to administrative agencies while analogizing agencies to grand juries); Powell, 379 
U.S. at 57.  
 140.  Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652. 
 141.  See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (concluding that 
the FTC’s request for a natural gas producer’s bid files was “reasonably relevant” to its investigation, 
and the FTC’s theory about the bid files was not “obviously wrong”). 
 142.  See id. at 877. 
 143.  See generally Hughes, supra note 123 (discussing the judicial approach to civil investigative 
demands being based on grand jury principles).  
 144.  See id. at 594–95. 
 145.  See id. at 581–82; but see Kerr, supra note 55 (noting the prosecutors actually have control 
over the grand jury).  
 146.  See Hughes, supra note 123, at 589.   
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executive branch and are subject to Congress’ oversight abilities; if they 
become overly aggressive, the President could be held accountable. 
In Carpenter, the Government analogized a 2703(d) order to a grand 
jury subpoena, arguing that the order is an acceptable form of compulsory 
process under the Fourth Amendment for the same reasons as grand jury 
and administrative subpoenas. Rejecting the Government’s argument, the 
Court concluded the Fourth Amendment requires a judicially issued war-
rant to compel disclosure of CSLI records, even if it had been a grand jury 
or administrative agency wishing to issue a subpoena for the same records. 
A. Government’s Grand Jury Argument in Carpenter 
Referencing the standard articulated in the seminal case, Oklahoma 
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling (“Oklahoma Press”), the Government 
argued its 2703(d) order is similar to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum 
and the Fourth Amendment allows it to subpoena documents as long as 
Congress authorized the investigation “for a purpose Congress can order,” 
the sought-after documents are relevant to the inquiry, and the “specifica-
tion of the documents to be produced [is] adequate, but not excessive, for 
the purposes of the relevant inquiry.”147 The Government argued that, on 
balance, the level of intrusiveness a subpoena imposes on an individual 
does not outweigh the significant governmental interest acquiring infor-
mation during the early stage of an investigation serves.148
On the privacy side, compulsory process is justified considering the 
subpoena target is requested to bring forth documents as opposed to the 
government finding the information itself. Further, intrusion is limited as a 
subpoena recipient may object before producing documents to the govern-
ment.149 Conversely, requiring a warrant supported by probable cause dur-
ing the early stages of an investigation would significantly hinder 
investigations in the public interest and render investigative duties nearly 
impossible.150 The Government asserted that its ability to investigate would 
suffer if it were required to establish probable cause to issue a subpoena 
when “the very purpose of requesting the information is to ascertain wheth-
er probable cause exists.”151
 147.  Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).  
 148.  Brief for the United States at 45–46, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 
16–402), 2017 WL 4311113. 
 149.  See Okla. Press, 327 U.S. at 195.  
 150.  See id. at 213. 
 151.  United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991). 
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Alluding to grand jury and administrative subpoenas, the Government 
emphasized that 2703(d) orders pursuant to the Stored Communications 
Act share similar features to other forms of compulsory process validated 
by courts without a warrant in that recipients bring forth the requested rec-
ords and can object to the production in court, and the government often 
relies on 2703(d) orders in preliminary investigations.152
Certainly, the standard prescribed in the SCA for compelling CSLI 
disclosure is more demanding than the standard imposed on a grand jury 
(or an administrative agency) to issue a valid subpoena.153 Congress decid-
ed on this standard after holding numerous hearings and debates. By ruling 
out the SCA standard as insufficient, the Court is supplanting Congress’s 
will as the voice of the People. 
As stated, a 2703(d) order requires the Government to establish “rea-
sonable and articulable facts” about the requested information being “rele-
vant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”154 And compelling 
disclosure pursuant a 2703(d) order requires judicial approval. By compari-
son, a subpoena duces tecum must be merely relevant to the Government’s 
investigation, and the documents requested need to be “adequate, but not 
excessive” for the same purposes.155 Issuing a subpoena typically does not 
require judicial involvement, but enforcing a subpoena after a recipient 
chooses not to comply requires a court order. 
Nonetheless, both grand juries and administrative agencies are afford-
ed great deference in subpoena enforcement. Intuitively, given that Con-
gress’s 2703(d) standard clearly satisfies the low subpoena requirements 
and offers more protection to a recipient, it follows that the 2703(d) order 
would be sufficient under the Fourth Amendment. But the subpoena analo-
gy did not serve the Government, as the Court concluded the warrant re-
quirement would still have been required even if a grand jury or 
administrative agency had issued a subpoena for the CSLI records. 
Admittedly, the scope of the Court’s holding beyond a 2703(d) order 
seeking location information is unclear. The question is open as to whether 
courts will apply Carpenter’s broad reasoning when evaluating government 
access to sensitive or personal information unrelated with location, which 
could be problematic for an individual or company considering how to 
respond to a subpoena. 
 152.  Brief for the United States at 46, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16–
402), 2017 WL 4311113.  
 153.  See id.
 154.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
 155.  Okla. Press, 327 U.S. at 209. 
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Justice Alito uses the SEC as an example of a federal agency with 
power to request documents through an administrative subpoena. Like oth-
er agencies, the SEC has expansive investigative power in the name of 
“investor protection” to obtain both business-related information and doc-
uments containing personal information such as medical, financial, and 
email data.156 According to Alito, any order compelling the production of 
documents containing sensitive information will now require a showing of 
probable cause.157 If that is the case, agencies that routinely obtain a wide 
range of information from individuals or companies—like the SEC—may 
lose some discretion in deciding which investigative leads to pursue and 
which data to obtain a warrant for.158
B. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
1. History and Creation 
In response to the worst economic crisis in American history, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt enacted a myriad of legislative programs dubbed the “New 
Deal,” which aimed to centralize federal government control over the 
economy. Among the legislative programs enacted within FDR’s first hun-
dred days in office was the Securities Act of 1933 (the “‘33 Act”)—the first 
act of a collection that would eventually become known as the federal secu-
rities laws. The Great Depression and Wall Street crash of 1929 provided 
the fuel necessary for Congress to create legislation governing the securi-
ties industry, an area in which states’ “blue sky” laws previously had au-
tonomy. Today, there are eight primary acts governing the capital markets 
industry: the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, and 
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012.159
 156.  See Slobogin, supra note 88, at 806–07; Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 
119, 124 (1953) (the intent of the Securities Act is “to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of 
information thought necessary to informed investment decisions”). 
 157.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2260–61 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 158.  See Paul Ohm, The Broad Reach of Carpenter v. United States, JUST SECURITY (June 27, 
2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58520/broad-reach-carpenter-v-united-states/. 
[https://perma.cc/3A6P-KSCH] 
 159.  The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html [https://perma.cc/U9H7-6JZU] (last modified Oct. 
1, 2013) [hereinafter THE LAWS THAT GOVERN] (last visited Feb. 28, 2019). 
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Generally, economic concern linked to investor confidence is one 
primary justification for American securities regulation.160 The prosperity 
of capital markets and financial communities depends on people being 
willing to invest, and people are more willing to invest if they have confi-
dence that they are not being taken advantage of.161 In theory, securities 
laws signify a commitment to curtailing marketplace abuse, and they add a 
layer of confidence in investors by mitigating the “fear of exploitation.”162
After Wall Street crashed in 1929 and many individual investors lost 
their savings to worthless securities in the postwar decade, investors un-
doubtedly lost faith in public markets. With the ‘33 Act, Congress spelled 
out its chosen remedy—disclosure.163 Often referred to as the “truth in 
securities” law, the ‘33 Act protects investors by requiring companies to 
fully and fairly disclose important financial information about public offer-
ings of securities during the registration process.164 Justifying the federal 
regulatory framework then depends on a core assumption that potential 
investors will behave rationally and make informed decisions about wheth-
er to purchase a company’s securities in response to the information they 
receive.165
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “‘34 Act”) imposed greater 
administrative responsibility and extended government reach further into 
the securities industry. Consequently, Congress established the Securities 
and Exchange Commission through Section 4 of the Act to address a laun-
dry list of problem areas.166 The ‘34 Act covers all aspects of publicly trad-
ed securities and also provides actions for market manipulation, insider 
trading, manipulation concerning the purchase or sale of stock, misstate-
ments among documents filed with the Commission, and various other 
problems with securities sales, sellers, and buyers.167 As such, Congress 
granted the SEC, along with other administrative agencies initiated around 
this time, broad power to directly regulate through rules, orders, and en-
forcement.168 But Congress also enacted a check on the executive branch 
and these relatively new agencies in 1946 with the Administrative Proce-
 160.  See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (Rachel E. 
Barkow et al. eds., 8th ed. 2017). 
 161.  See id. at 4.  
 162.  Id. at 5.  
 163.  See THE LAWS THAT GOVERN, supra note 159. 
 164.  Id.
 165.  See id.
 166.  See COX ET AL., supra note 160, at 9.  
 167.  See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 4 (Kris Markarian ed., 3d ed. 2011). 
 168.  See id. at 5. 
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dure Act, which gave courts the power to review and invalidate problemat-
ic administrative actions.169
2. The Division of Enforcement 
The SEC is an independent, nonpartisan agency that operates through 
four main divisions: the Division of Corporation Finance, the Division of 
Trading and Markets, the Division of Investment Management, and the 
Division of Enforcement. Because of its ability to investigate and prose-
cute, the Division of Enforcement gains frequent publicity and is the most 
prominent of the divisions to the general public.170 The Division of En-
forcement is typically poised to initiate either an administrative proceeding 
or enforcement action brought in a federal court, or to refer its findings to 
the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution after investigating.171
In October 2008, the Commission made its Enforcement Division 
manual (“Manual”) available for the first time, which lays out all the poli-
cies and procedures SEC enforcement officers are to follow while investi-
gating a possible securities violation.172 But for purposes of this Note, the 
most relevant process to emphasize is that which officers need to complete 
to issue a valid subpoena for documents or witnesses pursuant to federal 
securities laws.173
Initially, the SEC begins investigating a possible securities violation 
based on general market surveillance, investor complaints, media reports, 
reports from other SEC divisions and offices, or referrals from various 
other sources.174 After obtaining enough evidence, the Director of the Divi-
sion may issue a “Formal Order of Investigation,” which describes the na-
ture of the investigation and designates staff members as officers for the 
purposes of the investigation. Among other things, the designated officer 
has the power to subpoena witnesses and require document production.175
 169.  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2011); Tabaie, supra note 127, at 785–86.  
 170.  See COX ET AL., supra note 160, at 15. 
 171.  See HAZEN, supra note 167, at 18. 
 172.  See KEEPING CURRENT: The SEC Enforcement Manual—An aid to combat SEC investiga-
tions, AM. BAR ASS’N (June 29, 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2009/03/keeping_current_masella/ 
[https://perma.cc/CP39-45ES]. 
 173.  See SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N DIV. OF ENF’T, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 41 (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYS2-5L89] [herein-
after MANUAL]. 
 174.  See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, HOW INVESTIGATIONS WORK,
https://www.sec.gov/enforce/how-investigations-work.html [hereinafter HOW INVESTIGATIONS WORK]
[https://perma.cc/TSM2-8TX7] (last visited Feb. 28, 2019). 
 175.  MANUAL, supra note 173, at 17–18. 
744 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:3 
C. The SEC has Broad, Discretionary Subpoena Power 
The Commission has the power to subpoena any “books, papers, cor-
respondence, memoranda, or other records” that are “relevant or material” 
to the agency’s inquiry.176 Like other administrative agencies, an SEC sub-
poena must abide by the requirements laid out in Powell.177 For example, 
remembering the executive subpoenaed for documents from the hypothet-
ical described in the Introduction, she may object to the agency’s subpoena 
based on constitutional claims or that the Commission overstepped its 
boundaries in issuing the subpoena. Either objection would come about by 
bringing a motion to quash the subpoena in federal court. While not the 
only constitutional claim available, the hypothetical executive could chal-
lenge the subpoena under the Fourth Amendment, claiming that one or 
more of the Powell requirements is not satisfied. Taken with Oklahoma 
Press, the Fourth Amendment also requires the SEC’s subpoena to be defi-
nite enough in breadth and scope.178
As stated, the Powell standards are extremely easy to enforce, and that 
holds true for SEC subpoenas. The Commission has discretion in determin-
ing the justification for any given subpoena as the agency is the best situat-
ed to discern to what legitimate purpose the requested documents relate.179
Similarly, the relevancy requirement is inconsequential for the SEC as the 
agency does not have to affirmatively prove the documents requested are 
relevant; on the contrary, documents must not be “plainly irrelevant.”180
The last two requirements of the Powell test are technical ways to chal-
lenge a subpoena, which are seemingly unhelpful to an individual attempt-
ing to quash a subpoena based on privacy implications.181 Consequently, 
the current law does not provide much protection—much less privacy pro-
tection—through the Powell standards. 
 176.  15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (2015). 
 177.  See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964). 
 178.  See Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946) (noting the Fourth Amend-
ment protects against document requests being too indefinite in their description of items to be pro-
duced). 
 179.  See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1053 (2d Cir. 
1973) (acknowledging that the SEC must be free from interference when determining whether certain 
activities fall under its jurisdiction). 
 180.  Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1028–29 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 181.  See Tabaie, supra note 127, at 795–97. 
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IV. CARPENTER WILL SERVE AS A CHECK ON THE SEC’S VAST 
AUTHORITY TO OBTAIN INFORMATION
As Justice Alito suggests, one possibility after Carpenter is a sweep-
ing requirement that all court orders to produce documents containing sen-
sitive information must be supported by probable cause in the future. 
Certainly, that is an extreme example and would be “revolutionary.” For 
the SEC, Alito’s opinion might not be that far-fetched. After all, subpoenas 
issued by the SEC are functionally similar to a 2703(d) order described 
above in Part II.C, and the Commission often requests personal information 
from individuals during investigations that implicates the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
Referencing the 2703(d) order under the Stored Communications Act, 
Justice Alito asserts that “nothing stops [the majority’s] logic from sweep-
ing much further.”182 Requiring the court order to produce documents to be 
supported by probable cause ostensibly imposes the same requirement on 
grand jury subpoenas and other agencies with the power to issue document-
production orders such as the SEC, Federal Trade Commission, Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration, and others.183 For the same rea-
son, Justice Kennedy warns that “the subpoena practices of federal and 
state grand juries, legislatures, and other investigative bodies” are now 
uncertain.184
Mirroring the Government’s argument described in Part III.A, SEC 
subpoenas are often enforced without meeting warrant requirements for the 
same reasons observed in grand jury subpoenas and many other administra-
tive agencies. SEC subpoenas are minimally intrusive, objectionable by the 
recipient, and necessary in determining whether a possible violation of the 
securities laws exists. A valid 2703(d) order under the SCA has similar 
qualifications and a clearly higher standard to meet than an SEC subpoena 
conforming to Powell. Therefore, in theory, the Court’s invalidation of a 
2703(d) order compelling disclosure of location information in Carpenter
would, in turn, invalidate an SEC subpoena requesting personal infor-
mation akin to CSLI. 
Even as part of a corporate entity, the hypothetical executive’s privacy 
rights will be more salient after Carpenter when the SEC requests personal 
information. As the SEC often names both the entity and the individual or 
individuals in a formal investigation, distinguishing the rights between the 
 182.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2256 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 183.  Id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 184.  Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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two is significant. Courts have done just that and rarely recognize any sig-
nificant privacy interest in a corporation’s own books or other types of 
business records.185 That assertion stems back to over 100 years ago when 
the Court announced in Hale v. Henkel that the “corporation is a creature of 
the State,” and thus Congress is appropriately able to investigate a corpora-
tion’s papers for wrongdoing.186
Oklahoma Press made clear that the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
tect a corporation or its officers from producing corporate records and that 
requests for such documents are not actual “searches” under the Fourth 
Amendment.187 Therefore, Fourth Amendment requirements—such as 
probable cause—are not imposed on administrative subpoenas, at least 
when they seek corporate records.188
Shortly after the Oklahoma Press decision, the Court further differen-
tiated a corporation’s rights from an individual’s in United States v. Morton 
Salt Co. Because corporations are not equivalent to individuals in enjoying 
a right to privacy, neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendment privileges apply 
to them.189 Having both been decided in the corporate rights context, Okla-
homa Press and Morton Salt seemingly carved out a different policy for 
individuals—one that may have been alluded to in Carpenter.
An individual may still be unable to object to producing records such 
as corporate tax or payroll reports, but there are other types of business 
records that “implicate[] basic Fourth Amendment concerns about arbitrary 
government power much more directly.”190 In Carpenter, the “business 
record” Justice Roberts refers to is CSLI, which the SEC could theoretical-
ly issue a subpoena for under the ECPA. The Commission would have to 
comply with the requirements laid out in the statute, the Enforcement Man-
ual, and now Carpenter.
In fact, Congress has enacted several statutes that address individual 
privacy in response to broad agency subpoena power, namely, the Privacy 
Act of 1974, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, and the aforemen-
tioned Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. The SEC En-
 185.  See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651–52 (1950) (concluding that 
corporations as privileged entities do not enjoy the same rights to privacy as individuals); Okla. Press 
Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946) (the Fourth Amendment only protects against requests 
for corporate records that are too indefinite or irrelevant); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906). 
 186.  Henkel, 201 U.S. at 74–75 (1906). But see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 
682, 707–08 (2014) (concluding that a closely-held corporations is a “person” under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act). 
 187.  See 327 U.S. at 195–96, 202. 
 188.  See id. at 209–10.  
 189.  Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652. 
 190.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018). 
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forcement Manual details how the Commission and its officers should 
comply with all of these when requesting personal information from the 
public, banking information, or records of electronic communications.191
Notably, an individual customer has a privacy interest in financial records 
held by a bank under the RFPA, but regulated entities such as broker-
dealers or investment advisers are not afforded that same protection. Simi-
larly, email communications are protected under the ECPA when stored 
with third parties, but the ECPA does not extend to email communications 
stored on a company’s internal servers or communications held directly 
with the sender.192
The Carpenter holding implies that CSLI is just one example of a 
business record embodying the “modern-day equivalent of an individual’s 
own ‘papers’ or ‘effects.’” In United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit 
gave an illustrative analysis of Fourth Amendment protections in a modern 
world, holding that a CEO had a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
contents of his emails and that expectation was one society would deem 
reasonable.193 There, the Government seized around 27,000 emails from 
the CEO’s internet service provider pursuant to the SCA. The CEO’s email 
accounts were critical for business communications, but they also con-
tained his “entire personal life.”194 Because of the sensitive and sometimes 
incriminating information contained in the emails, the court concluded the 
CEO clearly expected the contents of his emails to remain private.195
Turning to the second prong of the Katz reasonableness test, the court 
emphasized email’s prominence in today’s modern communication and 
how individuals frequently and easily send sensitive information to oth-
ers.196 Access to an individual’s email may uncover business information 
“relevant” to the government’s or an agency’s inquiry, but access would 
also allow government officials or investigators a keen look into an indi-
vidual’s personal life and activities.197 The Fourth Amendment protects 
 191.  See MANUAL, supra note 170, at 79–81 (discussing compliance with the Privacy Act, Right to 
Financial Privacy Act, and Electronic Communications Privacy Act).  
 192.  Id. at 81. 
 193.  See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010); Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 194.  Warshak, 631 F.3d at 283–84. 
 195.  See id. at 284. 
 196.  Id. at 284 (“Lovers exchange sweet nothings, and businessmen swap ambitious plans, all with 
the click of a mouse button”). 
 197.  See id.
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other traditional forms of communication, and those protections should not 
dissipate on account of advancing technology.198
Although Warshak involved a third-party service provider, the holding 
still signifies important privacy protections in personal information for 
individuals involved with a business’s operations. The court recognized a 
privacy right in sensitive information, even though such information was 
blended with business communications that were undoubtedly “relevant” to 
the fraud investigation. Taken with Carpenter, courts have begun showing 
the willingness to expand and flex the Fourth Amendment to protect the 
privacy of sensitive digital information. 
V. THE HYPOTHETICAL HEDGE FUND EXECUTIVE HAS VIABLE
FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
In Carpenter, Justice Roberts assures the Government and administra-
tive agencies that the subpoena will still be available to them “in the over-
whelming majority of investigations.”199 Certainly, Carpenter does not 
overrule the Powell standards or render them inapplicable in enforcing 
most subpoenas. But when an individual is faced with an SEC subpoena 
requesting documents that are either purely personal or personal comingled 
with business documents, Carpenter allows a Fourth Amendment objection 
to producing those documents—even if the documents are relevant to the 
Commission’s inquiry. Of course, courts must decide whether Carpenter’s
reasoning covers sensitive and intimate information unrelated to location. 
That seems likely as the Court condemned Justice Alito’s view that pre-
scribed a “categorical limitation on the Fourth Amendment.”200 In other 
words, agencies and grand juries should not be able to circumvent the war-
rant requirement in obtaining personal documents such as “private letters” 
and the “digital contents of a cell phone” based on nothing more than “offi-
cial curiosity” behind a subpoena.201
For the hypothetical executive referenced above, she ought to bring a 
motion to quash the SEC’s subpoena, at least with regard to her personal 
smartphone and emails. Information gleaned from those two sources may 
be relevant to the SEC’s investigation, but they are both wrought with pri-
vacy concerns approaching the same level as CSLI.202 Under Warshak,
 198.  See id. at 285 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (advancing technology 
should not be allowed to “erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment”).  
 199.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018). 
 200.  Id.
 201.  Id.
 202.  See id.
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accessing the executive’s emails may require a warrant, especially if she 
does not have separate business and personal accounts. Accessing the ex-
ecutive’s smartphone, however, would almost surely require the SEC to 
obtain a warrant supported by probable cause. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
in Riley v. California recognized that modern cell phones are capable of 
storing vast amounts of sensitive information and the “privacies of life.”203
That phenomenon raises privacy concerns comparable to CSLI, but 
potential problems do not lie exclusively with a cell phone’s storage ca-
pacity. Smartphones give people abilities they have never had before with 
the touch of a finger, from paying virtually any bill to linking their diet or 
weight-monitoring program to their Fitbit. All of these examples raise pri-
vacy concerns at least as salient as those associated with CSLI, and some-
one like the hypothetical executive should not forgo her privacy because 
she wants to use modern capacities. Therefore, with the Carpenter Court’s 
approval of both Warshak and Riley, a greater level of scrutiny ought to be 
applied to administrative subpoenas requesting such personal infor-
mation—the “reasonable relevancy” standard combined with the Powell
requirements will not suffice. 
For the SEC, such an implication means the Commission may need to 
reconsider for which types of records it issues subpoenas and for which 
types of records the agency obtains a warrant. If anything, the officers 
drafting a subpoena should do so more carefully, focusing on documents 
that are clearly not private.204 A more precise subpoena would mitigate any 
potential litigation over subpoena enforcement for private documents, 
which seems to be a heavier consideration after Carpenter. The Commis-
sion could also develop an internal review board, separate from the investi-
gators, that looks for material which is protected. 
Undoubtedly, SEC regulated entities must assure they have an ade-
quate compliance system in place, especially with policies and procedures 
to address the production of business and personal documents. 
CONCLUSION
The need for investor protection and proper market regulation has not 
waned in the past years, and Carpenter should certainly not be interpreted 
in a way that hinders the investigative abilities of the SEC, grand juries and 
 203.  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
625 (1886)). In Riley, police officers’ safety did not justify ridding of the warrant requirement when 
searching through an arrestee’s cellphone. See id. at 401. 
 204.  See Tabaie, supra note 127, at 816. 
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other administrative agencies alike. However, as American citizens become 
more attached to and intertwined with their devices, the Supreme Court has 
highlighted the tenuous balance between regulatory efficiency and constitu-
tional protections. Rather than allowing agencies such as the SEC to de-
mand documents based only on “official curiosity,” more scrutiny ought to 
be applied to document requests implicating private documents, especially 
as more people rely on modern technology for myriad purposes today. 
While technological advances have convoluted the Fourth Amendment 
privacy doctrine and created concerns the Framers could never have imag-
ined, the sheer difficulty or complexity in enforcing constitutional rights is 
no reason to abandon them altogether. 
